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Abstract 
This article considers the potential impact of the withdrawal of the UK on EU financial services 
law and its institutional arrangements. While speculation is currently perilous, this article 
suggests that the impact of Brexit on EU financial governance will be contained and most likely 
limited. The greatest uncertainty relates to the EU’s evolving supervisory/institutional 
arrangements. Brexit may be one of the factors which leads to a significant future empowerment 
of the European Supervisory Authorities, and in particular the European Securities and Markets 
Authority. But it is only one of a range of complex, dynamic and symbiotic political forces, 
institutional interests, legal constraints and functional challenges which must combine in the EU’s 
governance reform crucible if material reform is to follow. 
 
1. Scene setting 
 
The 14-15 December 2017 decision by the European Council that the EU/UK withdrawal 
negotiations could move on to the second phase (“related to transition and the framework of the 
future relationship”)1 opened the gateway to negotiations on the potential treatment of financial 
services under any new EU/UK settlement. In practice, the effects of the UK’s future withdrawal 
were already being felt in the financial services sphere. The 20 November 2017 decision by the 
General Affairs Council that Paris would be the new home of the London-based European Banking 
Authority2 was widely reported as the first tangible step in the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, but 
there were already multiple indications of a changing regulatory and market environment. 
Regulated actors in the UK have been making contingency plans,3 including for the EU27 
relocation.4 Warnings have been issued as to the risks to the EU27 and UK financial systems from 
a disorderly or hard Brexit which would leave the UK’s financial sector with limited access rights 
to the single market and which could disrupt EU/UK financial stability and funding capacity.5 The 
EU’s supervisory bodies, the European Central Bank within Banking Union’s Single Supervisory 
Mechanism, and the three European Supervisory Authorities within the European System of 
Financial Supervision, had produced guidelines on how UK firms and EU27 supervisors should 
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1European Council (Art. 50), Guidelines of 15 Dec. 2017, EUCO XT 20011/17, para 1. 
2Council of the EU, “European Banking Authority to be relocated to Paris, France”, Press Release 689/17, 20 Nov. 
2017. 
3While industry preparations would have been expected, the UK regulators have required regulated actors to prepare 
contingency plans (letter from Bank of England Deputy Governor Woods to House of Commons Treasury 
Committee, 2 Aug. 2017) as have EU regulators (e.g. European Central Bank, Banking Supervision, “Brexit – an 
ECB Supervision Perspective”, 15 Nov. 2017). 
4Some 13 banking groups are estimated to have chosen Frankfurt or Berlin as their new EU hub, while Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands look set to attract business, particularly in the asset management and 
insurance sectors: Jenkins, “How the city finally raised its voice over Brexit”, Financial Times, 3 Oct. 2017. One 
report has estimated the best-to-worst-case scenario for job losses in the UK financial sector across a spectrum from 
3-4,000 to 65-75,000 jobs: “The impact of the UK’s exit from the EU on the UK-Based financial services sector”, 
(Oliver Wyman, 2016), p. 14. 
5The Bank of England has warned of the potential for a fragmentation in funding sources which could generate risks 
for the EU as well as UK firms and households; a need for substitute sources of finance; and significant costs arising 
from a disruption to the “clearing” services which are essential to risk management in the derivatives markets; see 
Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, June 2017. 
approach the relocation process.6 Brexit was beginning to leak into more long-term design 
decisions on the future shape of EU financial market governance. Brexit effects can be associated 
with the Commission’s September 2017 Proposal to reform the European Supervisory Authorities7 
as well as the Commission’s June 2017 Proposal to reorder how the EU currently arranges the 
supervision of Central Clearing Counterparties (CCPs) – the arcane but systemically critical 
financial market infrastructures which support risk management in derivatives markets.8 Brexit 
may also be linked to the hints from the Commission in early 2017 that it would review more 
generally how it approaches the “equivalence” process which usually governs whether, and the 
extent to which, third country regulated actors can access the EU financial market on the basis of 
their home regulation and supervision.9 
Since the December 2017 European Council, and although trade negotiations are yet to 
take place pending agreement on transitional arrangements, the indications that change is afoot 
continue to amass. The Commission’s December 2017 Proposals to reform the prudential 
regulation of investment firms contain ambitious and far-reaching reforms to empower the ECB 
within Banking Union’s Single Supervisory Mechanism to supervise Banking Union’s largest 
systemic investment firms. These reforms can readily be associated with Brexit-related concerns 
to shore up EU supervisory governance.10 The late December 2017 decision by the Commission 
to grant Switzerland only a conditional, one-year “equivalence” period in relation to its regulation 
and supervision of stock exchanges, which has been contested by Switzerland, has also been 
related to Brexit effects, in the form of the signalling of an uncompromising EU approach towards 
third countries.11 
Markets are continuing to evolve. While early 2018 saw EU financial markets enter a new 
regulatory era with the coming into force of the massive new Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive II regime - which required a behemoth industry implementation effort and is set to lead 
to some industry restructuring in the EU12 - it also saw reports of strengthening competition in 
                                                 
6See for Banking Union, ECB Banking Supervision, Guidance on Relocating to the Euro Area, April 2017 and for 
the single market, the series of opinions on relocation adopted by the three European Supervisory Authorities, e.g., 
European Securities and Markets Authority, Opinion. General Principles to Support Supervisory Convergence in the 
Context of the UK Withdrawing from the European Union (ESMA42-110-433) (2017) and its related opinions on 
relocation for investment firms, asset managers and secondary markets (ESMA35-43-762, ESMA35-45-344 and 
ESMA 70-154-270, all 13 July 2017). 
7COM(2017)536. 
8COM(2017)208. 
9Commission, “EU equivalence decisions in financial services policy: An assessment”, SWD(2017)102. 
10COM(2017)790 and COM(2017)791. The ECB reforms (which are based on re-classifying large systemic 
investment firms as “credit institutions” and thereby bringing such firms, where they are based in Banking Union, 
into the ECB-overseen single supervisory mechanism). They are in part designed to update the EU’s regulatory 
architecture to reflect the pivotal role played by UK investment firms in the EU financial market and the expected 
relocation by many of these firms of parts of their operations to the Banking Union zone: COM(2017)790, pp. 2-3. 
11Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/2441 of 17 Dec. 2017, on the equivalence of the legal and 
supervisory framework applicable to stock exchanges in Switzerland in accordance with Directive 2014/65/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council, O.J. 2017, L 344/52. The Commission found that Switzerland’s 
regulatory arrangements met the equivalence requirements, but a time limitation was imposed linked to Switzerland 
agreeing to “the establishment of a common institutional framework for existing and future agreements through 
which Switzerland participates in the Single Market” (recital 30). While related to ongoing EU/Swiss tensions 
concerning the institutional management of their bilateral relations, the conditional decision (which was not 
supported by the UK) was reported as having implications for the UK’s access as a third country: Khan, 
“Switzerland hits out at EU ‘discrimination’ in finance dispute”, Financial Times, 21 Dec. 2017. 
12Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014, on markets in financial 
instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, O.J. L 173/349 and Regulation 
600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on financial instruments and amending 
Regulation 648/2012, O.J. 2014, L 173/84. The coming into force of the regime on 3 Jan. 2018 and its market 
impact was widely reported across the media and required last-minute interventions from Member State regulators 
as well as the European Securities and Markets Authority. 
certain Member States for UK-located financial services business.13 Early 2018 also saw concern 
that reported difficulties in negotiating transition arrangements could lead to an agreement not 
being reached at the March 2018 European Council and generate industry difficulties and market 
disruption.14 
This snapshot hints at the mosaic of short- and long-term effects which Brexit may have 
for the EU financial market and its governance. It also underlines the continuing high political, 
policy and market salience of EU financial services law and policy, even as the epochal crisis-era 
period recedes and its maturing institutional arrangements, notably the European System of 
Financial Supervision and Banking Union, bed in. This discussion considers why financial 
services are experiencing such high salience in the Brexit debate and whether and the extent to 
which Brexit is likely to have short- but also more long-term effects on EU financial governance. 
 
 
2. The short and long(er) term picture: Trade/access arrangements and the high, but 
asymmetric salience of financial services 
 
2.1. The UK – looking outward and building a new access arrangement 
 
Since the June 2016 referendum, the fate of its prized financial services sector, a motor of the UK 
economy,15 has pre-occupied much of the UK debate on Brexit.16 Given the current uncertainty on 
the negotiations, speculation as to the outcome for financial services is perilous. Nonetheless, one 
legal outcome can be predicted reasonably safely. Prime Minister May’s September 2017 
“Florence Speech”17 affirmed that the UK will leave the single market and will not seek 
membership of the European Economic Area, and the Prime Minister’s March 2018 “Mansion 
House” speech re-affirmed this position.18 Accordingly, on its withdrawal from the EU, the UK 
will become a “third country” and UK financial firms will lose their single market “passport.” The 
December 2017 European Council has also noted the UK’s intention not to participate in the single 
market after a (to-be-negotiated) transition period.19 This matters, as the “passport” allows 
financial firms to navigate one of the most heavily regulated sectors of the EU economy without 
incurring the costs of duplicate regulation and supervision. 
The EU’s single financial market is, in common with major financial markets globally, 
subject to dense regulation in the wake of the financial crisis, exemplified by the MiFID II/MiFIR 
leviathan. EU firms can navigate this market on the basis of a single licence or “passport.” Under 
sectoral financial legislation, once authorized in its “home” Member State (typically, the State 
where the actor is incorporated or registered), a financial actor can operate through branches or 
                                                 
13Particularly in relation to asset management: Walter, “Spooked fund managers look at rivals to London”, Financial 
Times, 17 Feb. 2018. 
14Stafford, “Brexit anxieties grow over market disruption”, Financial Times, 22 Feb. 2018. 
15The sector generates some £190-205 billion in revenues; employs (directly and indirectly) in the region of 1.1 
million people; generates some £60-67 billion in taxation; and contributes some £58 billion to the UK balance of 
payments: Wyman, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 2. 
16See e.g. House of Lords, “Brexit the future of financial regulation and supervision”, (2018) EU Committee, 11th 
Report of Session 2017-2019. 
17Speech on “A new era of cooperation and partnership between the UK and the EU”, 22 Sep. 2017, available at: 
<www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-florence-speech-a-new-era-of-cooperation-and-partnership-between-the-
uk-and-the-eu>. 
18 Speech on “Our future economic partnership with the European Union”, 2 Mar. 2018, available at: 
www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-on-our-future-economic-partnership-with-the-european-union. The 
speech also indicated that the UK will not seek an agreement based on the Canada agreement (EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)), given that this would mean a significant reduction in 
market access, but would instead see a bespoke agreement which would, for services, “break new ground.” 
19European Council (Art. 50), Guidelines cited supra note 1, para 7. 
cross-border service provisions based on home Member State regulation and supervision (in 
accordance with the EU’s dense “single rulebook” and within the supervisory coordination 
arrangements of the European System of Financial Supervision). Third country actors, by contrast, 
do not benefit from “passporting” rights. Unless they become EU firms by using EU subsidiaries, 
their access is contingent on the EU’s complex and partial “third country” regime, which provides 
only very limited access to the EU market and is usually dependent on the relevant third country’s 
regulatory/supervisory arrangements being “equivalent” to those of the EU.20 These third 
country/equivalence rules are a legally unstable and politically unpalatable basis for UK access to 
the EU for a number of reasons.21 From among the myriad functional and political difficulties for 
the UK, they cover only a limited number of financial sectors; they are contingent on a 
Commission decision, which can be withdrawn; they require that the third country regime remains 
equivalent into the future – notwithstanding the dynamism of financial regulation; and they are 
subject to the ECJ’s oversight. The Commission’s end 2017 conditional decision on the 
equivalence of Swiss stock exchange rules underlines the extent to which equivalence is controlled 
by the EU and is shaped by the EU’s interests in protecting single market integrity.22 
With the UK exporting some 25 percent of its financial services to the EU,23 concern as to 
the wider, destabilizing “network” effects of a withdrawal of capital and liquidity from the City of 
London into the EU and internationally, together with evidence that UK firms are planning to 
relocate parts of their operations to the EU27 to avoid the vagaries of third country equivalence,24 
there are calls being made in the UK for alternative access routes, which would form part of a new 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA).25 Prime Minister May’s March 2018 “Mansion House” speech 
underlined the importance of financial services in the negotiations, expressly referencing financial 
services and calling for an access arrangement based on a “collaborative, objective framework that 
is reciprocal, mutually agreed, and permanent and therefore reliable for business” and on the EU 
and UK maintaining the same “regulatory outcomes” over time.26 Sophisticated new 
regulatory/access technology - typically based on the EU and UK “deferring” to each other’s 
regulatory regimes on the basis of a minimum set of agreed standards arrangements for managing 
regulatory divergence, and coordination systems for supervision and for fiscal support in times of 
crisis (all a bespoke form of “mutual recognition”) - which could provide the basis for such an 
                                                 
20Other access routes are available, including “reverse solicitation” (which allows third country firms access the EU 
without being subject to EU law where the service follows an unsolicited client request) and delegation techniques 
(based on delegating/outsourcing services from an EU27 presence back to the UK firm). These are often regarded as 
insufficiently stable to support access, particularly in light of recent indications from EU regulators as to their 
hostility to UK firms operating through EU “letter boxes”. See further Moloney, “The EU and its investment 
banker: Rethinking equivalence for the EU capital market”, (2017) LSE Law Society and Economy Working Paper 
Series, WP No 5/2017, available at <www.ssrn.com/abstract=2929229>. 
21See Alexander, Barnard, Ferran, Lang, and Moloney (Eds.), Brexit and Financial Services. Law and Policy (Hart 
Publishing, 2018); Moloney, op. cit. supra note 20; Ferran, “The UK as a third country in EU financial services 
regulation”, 3 Journal of Financial Regulation (2017), 40; Armour, “Brexit and financial services”, 33 Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, (2017), S54. 
22See supra note 11. 
23Wyman Report, cit. op. supra note 4. 
24In Oct. 2017, the Ernst and Young “EY Brexit tracker for financial services” which monitors relocation statements 
by over 200 of the largest UK financial services companies reported that 30% of firms were considering moving 
operations. 
25To date, no FTA entered into by the EU (including the much-examined CETA) provides financial services access 
in any way similar to the passport.  See further Lang, “The ‘default option’? The WTO and cross-border financial 
services trade after Brexit”, in Alexander et al, cit. supra note 20 
26 See supra note 18. In a follow-up speech on 7 Mar. 2018 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Hammond, 
called for a bespoke arrangement based on achieving “fully equivalent regulatory outcomes” and on “mutual 
recognition and reciprocal regulatory equivalence” (speech on “Financial Services” available at:<  
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chancellors-hsbc-speech-financial-services >. 
arrangement had earlier been suggested by industry groupings in the UK.27 An extreme if 
nonetheless not atypical example of the concerns which are driving the UK’s push for special 
treatment for financial services relates to central clearing counterparties (CCPs). Arcane though 
they may be, CCPs are the “nuclear powerhouses” of the EU financial market, standing at the 
epicentre of the behemoth EU derivatives market (which is essential to the stability and 
effectiveness of the EU financial market), “clearing” billions of euro value transactions in 
derivatives, by standing between, and providing risk management support to, counterparties 
engaging in derivative transactions.28 The UK is the major centre for CCP services in the EU. 
Some 50 percent of all interest rate swap transactions - critical for interest rate risk management 
in the EU economy - are cleared in the UK,29 while the four UK CCPs (LCH Clearnet, ICE Clear 
Europe, LME Clear, and CME Clearing Europe) together are a major provider of clearing services 
in derivatives to the EU 27: LCH.Clearnet, for example, is the market leader in euro-denominated 
clearing.30 The dominance of the UK as the EU centre for the clearing of euro-denominated 
instruments has been a source of tension for some time, culminating in the UK successfully 
challenging the validity of the ECB’s “location policy” for euro-denominated derivatives clearing 
(which required that such clearing take place in the euro area and be subject to ECB liquidity 
support).31 Since the Brexit referendum, these tensions have intensified with the prospect of euro-
related clearing, a very significant element of its financial market, operating “offshore” in the 
UK.32 Much of the UK’s Brexit planning efforts, which include facilitating access by EU27/EEA 
firms to the UK,33 are focusing on the development of a bespoke arrangement for this specialist 
but highly valuable segment of its financial market,34 even as the EU industry seeks to draw in 
clearing business from the UK35 and as the EU develops measures to require the “relocation” of 
such business through regulatory fiat.36 
 
2.2. The EU – looking inward and buttressing its internal arrangements 
                                                 
27Major industry contributions include UK Finance, “Supporting Europe’s economies and citizens: A modern 
approach to financial services in an EU-UK Trade Agreement” (2017), available through <www.ukfinance.org.uk> 
and International Regulatory Strategy Group, “A New Basis for Access to EU/UK Financial Services Post Brexit” 
(2017). Special treatment for financial services in a new FTA has support from the leadership of the UK’s 
regulators, see e.g. Speech by Bailey, FCA Chief Executive, “Free trade in financial services and global regulatory 
standards: Friends not rivals”, 26 Jan. 2017 and Carney, Bank of England Governor, “A fine balance”, 20 June 
2017. 
28CCPs manage “counterparty risk” in derivatives contracts by “clearing” transactions” - or acting as a seller to 
every buyer and as a buyer to every seller. CCP clearing guarantees the performance of derivatives contracts and 
thereby reduces the financial stability risk to the financial system. The requirement for CCP clearing is implemented 
in the EU under the EMIR Regulation (Regulation 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 
July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories, O.J. 2012, L 201/1). 
29IMF, Oct. 2016 Global Financial Stability Report, p. 42. 
30Batsaikhan, Kalcik, and Schoenmaker, “Brexit and the European financial system: Mapping markets, players, and 
jobs”, Bruegel Policy Contribution No. 4 (2017), p. 9-10.  
31Case T-496/11, UK v. European Central Bank, EU:T:2015:133. 
32Some Member States have been reported as seeking the repatriation of euro-denominated clearing to the euro area: 
Reuters, “France wants right to veto Euro clearing in the EU after Brexit – EU sources”, Market News, 6 Sept. 2017. 
33Towards the end of 2017, the UK Prudential Regulation Authority announced that, at least for the moment, 
“inbound” EEA firms seeking branch access can assume that it will regard EU requirements as equivalent to UK 
requirements for the purposes of UK authorization/access and will accordingly only require subsidiarization (and 
prohibit access through branches) where relevant conditions are met, including that material retail business is 
carried out: Prudential Regulation Authority, “Dear CEO letter. Firms’ preparations for the UK’s withdrawal from 
the European Union: Planning assumptions”, 20 Dec. 2017. 
34E.g. International Regulatory Strategy Group, CCPs Post Brexit (2017). 
35Stafford, “Deutsche Bӧrse eyes city of London Euro clearing crown”, Financial Times, 20 Nov. 2017. 
36In summer 2017, the Commission proposed a new regime for “relocating” third country clearing into the EU 
(albeit when only a series of threshold conditions relating to systemic risk/financial stability are met): 
COM(2017)203. 
 The picture from the EU is different, with the EU adopting a more inward-oriented posture and 
buttressing its single market governance arrangements. 
 At first sight, the EU’s preferences on financial services access arrangements should be 
aligned with the UK’s as Brexit may lead to structural change to, and disruption within, the EU 
financial system if a reliable EU/UK financial services pipeline is not constructed. The EU 
financial system is predominantly bank-based: most funding to the EU economy is in the form of 
bank-provided credit.37 EU financial governance has, however, long promoted market-based 
funding to diversify funding sources and thereby strengthen financial stability; the current 
Capital Markets Union (CMU) agenda, adopted in 2015 and the main pillar of the current EU 
financial regulation policy,38 is only the most recent in a series of efforts to wean the EU from its 
dependence on bank funding. The UK is the primary EU location for market-based funding,39 
implying that a degree of EU market dislocation is inevitable in the absence of a bespoke 
EU/UK access arrangement. The UK hosts the largest fund management industry in the EU,40 
for example, with some 37 percent of assets under management in the EU managed in the UK.41 
Similarly, more than half of all private equity funding raised in the EU is raised in the UK.42 
Overall, some 35 percent of all wholesale financial services activity in the EU takes place in the 
UK.43 
 The extent to which the EU financial market will be disrupted by Brexit is not clear and 
will not be for some time. The ECB appears relatively sanguine,44 and the EU market can be 
expected to evolve without the UK pipeline and even in the absence of buffering trade agreements. 
Financial systems are innovative and also display an evolutionary bias to becoming more market-
based, as advances in financial engineering, technological developments, and the globalization of 
funding markets give market-based funding a competitive advantage over bank funding.45 Market-
based funding, or at least greater reliance by banks on market sources for their funding and risk 
management, is growing across the EU.46 This growth is likely to moderate the impact of Brexit, 
as will the steps being taken by UK firms to relocate their EU business to the EU27. The EU also 
appears determined to embed the CMU agenda and to develop substitutes for UK-based wholesale 
market business.47 Nonetheless, an abrupt rupture between the UK and the EU27 could disrupt the 
EU financial market, generate financial stability risks, reduce the capacity of the EU financial 
                                                 
37Commission, Economic Analysis Accompanying the Commission Communication on the Mid-Term Review of the 
Capital Markets Union Action Plan (SWD(2017)224), 36-37 and Commission, European Financial Stability and 
Integration Review (SWD(2016)146) 33. 
38The Capital Markets Union (CMU) agenda, adopted in Sept. 2015 (Commission, Green Paper, Building a Capital 
Markets Union (COM(2015)63)), is a predominantly regulatory agenda designed to liberalize capital markets in the 
EU and promote market-based funding. 
39E.g. Djankov, “The City of London after Brexit”, (2017) LSE Financial Markets Group Discussion Paper No. 762. 
40IMF, “UK financial sector assessment program, financial system stability assessment”, (2016) IMF Country 
Report 16/167, p. 9. 
41Magnus, Margerit, and Mesnard, “Brexit: The United Kingdom and EU financial services”, EU Parliament 
Briefing Paper, 9 Dec. 2016. 
42Commission, European Financial Stability and Integration Review, cited supra note 37, p. 28. 
43Wyman, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 2. 
44ECB, “Financial Stability in Europe”, May 2017, pp. 28-30. For a similarly optimistic analysis see European 
Research Centre for Economic and Financial Governance, “Implications of Brexit on EU financial services”, 
(2017), Study for the European Parliament ECON Committee, IP/A/ECON/2016-22. 
45FCA, “Market-based Finance: Its contributions and emerging issues”, Occasional Paper 18 (2016). 
46As has been charted by, e.g. ECB, Financial Integration in Europe (2016). 
47See, e.g. Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the mid-term review of the capital 
markets Union action plan”, (COM(2017)292). 
system to fund the real economy, and threaten the achievement of the EU’s flagship CMU policy 
agenda.48 
While the EU might therefore be regarded as having incentives to construct a new form of 
market access arrangement for the UK,49 the technical design challenges are considerable. Mutual 
recognition/deference arrangements, on the lines being developed in the UK at the moment, are 
rare in international financial governance.50 States internationally have limited incentives to adopt 
a liberal approach, given the absence of extensive international standards for financial regulation 
and of related arrangements for supervisory coordination and for risk-sharing in crisis conditions.51 
Most “host” regimes, to which visiting “home” financial actors (registered/incorporated in the 
“home” State) seek access, require third country actors to follow - at least to a material extent - 
their domestic “host” rules. They only provide exemptions where the relevant “home” rules are 
“equivalent” to or can “substitute” for host rules; they also usually require third country actors to 
be registered and subject to some form of monitoring in the host State.52 The EU’s third country 
arrangements follow this model, imposing EU host rules through the “equivalence” device, 
although many regimes internationally are more intrusive than the EU in requiring fuller host 
supervision than the EU usually requires.53 The EU has also shown itself willing to tolerate access 
arrangements based on a pragmatic and outcomes-based approach to  equivalence, rather than a 
formalistic treatment. For example, in 2016 the EU reached a hard-fought agreement, based on 
the EU’s third country regime but reflecting the notion of outcomes-based deference, with the US 
authorities on the treatment of mutual access by CCPs to EU/US derivatives markets.54 On the 
other hand, the recent Swiss experience, mentioned above, underlines the EU’s commitment to 
protecting its single market institutions and regulatory arrangements. 
Thus far, there are few signs that the EU - which, notwithstanding recent accommodations, 
has a long history of imposing its regulatory will through its third country rules55 - is prepared to 
offer a bespoke access arrangement to the UK which would side-step the limitations of the third 
country rules and, at the same time, match single market access but without requiring the 
embedding of the UK within the immense superstructure of regulation and supervisory 
coordination which supports and manages risk within the single market in financial services. 
Access arrangements for financial services are expressly mentioned in the UK’s “Article 50” 
letter.56 They are not, by contrast, noted directly in the European Council’s April 2017 negotiating 
Guidelines, and a reluctance to entertain bespoke arrangements can be implied in the reference in 
the Guidelines to the need for any future agreement to safeguard EU financial stability and respect 
its regulatory and supervisory regime; the draft negotiating Guidelines on the framework for the 
future relationship, proposed by European Council President Tusk on 7 March 2018,  are similarly 
                                                 
48On the potential costs see Sapir, Schoenmaker, and Véron, “Making the best of Brexit for the EU27 financial 
system, Bruegel Policy Brief, Feb. 2017. 
49And leaving to one side the WTO complications which might arise: see further Lang, op. cit. supra note 25. 
50For a review see IOSCO, Task Force on Cross Border Regulation. Final Report (FR/23/2015). 
51Verdier, “Mutual recognition in international finance” 52 Harv.Int’Ll.J. (2011), 56 
52See further Moloney, op. cit. supra note 20. 
53The EU’s current arrangements for third country CCPs e.g. are more “open” than those which typically apply 
internationally, in that the EU does not require close ongoing supervision of third country CCPs but relies instead on 
home supervision. 
54Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/377 of March 2016, on the equivalence of the regulatory 
framework of the United States of America for central counterparties that are authorized and supervised by the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission to the requirements of Regulation (EU) 648/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, O.J. 2016, L 70/32. 
55Quaglia, The European Union & global financial regulation (OUP, 2014). 
56Letter from UK Prime Minister May to European Council President Tusk, 29 March 2017, available at: 
<www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-letter-to-donald-tusk-triggering-article-50>.The letter noted 
that the UK and the EU had regulatory frameworks that already matched and that the negotiations should 
accordingly prioritize how the evolution of regulatory frameworks could be managed and related disputes resolved.  
austere, not referencing financial services but noting that there can be no “cherry picking” through 
single market sector-by-sector participation, and providing that an FTA in services generally 
would aim to allow market access under host state rules, consistent with the UK being a third 
country.57 Similarly, the reference in the European Council’s December 2017 Guidelines on 
negotiating transitional arrangements to the UK not participating in EU agencies over any 
transitional period but being required to follow any changes to the acquis made by such agencies58 
implies a concern to protect current single market arrangements, given the importance of the three 
European Supervisory Authorities to the development of EU financial governance.59 The 
European Parliament, in its April 2017 Brexit Resolution, made express reference to financial 
services, but only to underline that there can be no “cherry picking” and that the UK on withdrawal 
will become a third country, sitting outside the single market.60 In the wake of the December 2017 
European Council, the EU’s chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, warned that a special deal will not 
be available for financial services.61 Earlier in 2017, the Commission, in a delicately timed and 
frostily-toned report on the third country rules which apply to financial services (which does not 
mention Brexit but whose significance needs no underlining), warned that equivalence was not a 
market access device but a means for supporting EU stability; in a direction of travel which augurs 
ill for bespoke arrangements, it warned that jurisdictions of more systemic importance to the EU 
should receive closer attention in the equivalence process.62 The December 2017 Proposal to 
reform the regulation of investment firms reflects this direction of travel, materially strengthening 
the equivalence assessment which currently applies to investment firms, including by requiring a 
“detailed and granular assessment.”63 At the supervisory/technocratic level, the ECB within 
Banking Union and the European Supervisory Authorities within the single market’s European 
System of Financial Supervision have over 2017, and as industry contingency planning got under 
way, adopted a robust posture on relocations of UK-based business to the EU, adopting guidelines 
which underline the need for adequate local structures and sufficient risk management capacity.64 
That the EU is proving, so far at least, unwilling to contemplate bespoke access 
arrangements and cleaving to its established third country arrangements, notwithstanding the 
potential market risks, is not surprising. The third country rules have, over time, been the subject 
of political contestation reflecting differing national positions on the desirability of a liberal access 
                                                 
57European Council (Art. 50), Guidelines, following the United Kingdom’s notification under Art. 50 TEU, 29 April 
2017, para 21 and European Council (Art 50) 23 March 2018) – Draft Guidelines, 7 Mar. 2018, para. 7. 
58European Council (Art. 50), Guidelines cited supra note 1, paras. 3-4. These Guidelines have been reflected in the 
Draft Withdrawal Agreement (28 Feb. 2018 TF50 (2018 33). Arts. 2, 122 and 126  together provide that the UK will 
be subject to acts adopted by the agencies of the EU, while Art. 6 provides that the UK will not participate in the 
decision-making and governance of agencies. The Draft Agreement provides, however, that the UK may (by 
invitation, on a case-by-case basis, and exceptionally, and without voting rights) attend agency meetings, but only 
where the discussion concerns individual acts to be addressed during the transition period to the UK (or to natural or 
legal persons residing or established in the UK) or the presence of the UK is necessary and in the interests of the 
EU, in particular for the effective implementation of EU law during the transition period (Art. 123(5)).  
59See further Moloney, The age of ESMA: Governing EU financial markets (Hart Publishing, 2018), (forthcoming). 
60European Parliament, Negotiations with the UK following its notification that it intends to withdraw from the EU, 
5 April 2017 (P8_TA-PROV(2017)0102). 
61Rankin, “UK cannot have a special deal for the City, says Brexit negotiator”, The Guardian, 18 Dec. 2017, 
reporting on Michel Barnier as stating “there is no place [for financial services]. There is not a single trade 
agreement that is open to financial services”. 
62Commission working document, cited supra note 9. 
63COM(2017)790, Art 61. 
64See supra note 6. 
posture.65 The Brexit-related competitive territory at stake for the Member States66 makes it 
unlikely that a reconsideration of the third country regime - whether as a matter of horizontal 
legislative re-design for all third countries or for the UK specifically in an FTA - will be 
straightforward. Institutionally, the European Parliament appears sceptical of any bespoke EU/UK 
arrangement. It also appears increasingly suspicious of the Commission’s role in international 
financial governance67 and might be expected to resist any bespoke arrangement which 
strengthens the Commission’s role – whether in relation to equivalence assessments, supervisory 
coordination, dispute resolution, or otherwise. 
More fundamentally, since 2008 the EU has invested immense political, fiscal and 
institutional capital in the construction of the financial governance superstructure which supports 
the single financial market and which is designed to facilitate cross-border activity and at the same 
time contain the financial stability risks which, as the financial crisis exposed, can be transmitted 
cross-border to catastrophic effect. The “single rulebook” and the coordination of nationally-based 
supervisory governance for the single market through the European System of Financial 
Supervision, and Banking Union’s distinct risk mutualization structures for the euro area banking 
sector, were not easy to construct, given the host of legal, political and institutional complexities. 
Not least among these is the high degree of political contestation which accompanies EU financial 
governance - in part linked to persistent underlying structural differences in national financial 
systems, and in part linked to the tensions which risk-mutualization and the sharing of the fiscal 
risks of supervision generate; how the different Member State interests, including those of the UK, 
have shaped current arrangements is noted in the following section.68 The EU can be expected to 
protect this hard-won governance structure, including its third country arrangements, and to resist 
single market access which sits outside current governance arrangements. So far, all the 
indications suggest that any Brexit-prompted reforms to the third country regime are likely to be 
in the direction of a deeper embedding of the current legislative, single-market-based model. As 
discussed below, the Commission has proposed that the three European Supervisory Authorities 
be given additional powers to monitor ongoing compliance by third countries with equivalence 
conditions and, in the case of the European Securities and Markets Authority, be given direct 
supervisory powers over third country actors. There are few signs of any appetite for building a 
bespoke UK or an entirely new third country system - and many signs of the EU building an 
institutional capacity to supervise third country actors and monitor equivalence conditions within 
its single market structures. 
 
 
3. The Long(er) term picture: The single rulebook 
 
The withdrawal of the UK is also unlikely to have material effects on EU regulatory governance. 
Over and since the financial crisis era, the direction of EU financial regulation has been set by the 
                                                 
65National preferences can vary depending on e.g. the exposure of a national market to the international market. See 
Quaglia, “The politics of ‘third country equivalence’ in post-crisis financial services regulation in the European 
Union”, 38 Western European Politics (2015), 167. 
66France’s concern to capture financial services business from the UK has been well documented (e.g. Mooney and 
Thompson, “Europe’s national regulators clash over delegation”, Financial Times, 8 Oct. 2017), while Frankfurt has 
also made overtures (Noonan, “Frankfurt offers ‘risk takers’ post- Brexit exemptions”, Financial Times, 3 July 
2017). 
67European Parliament, ECON Committee, Report on the EU Role in the Framework of International Financial, 
Monetary and Regulatory Institutions and Bodies (A8-0027/2016) (2016). 
68For a recent assessment of the preferences and interests which shaped current financial governance arrangements 
see Burns, Clifton and Quaglia, “Explaining policy change in the EU: Financial reform after the crisis”, (2017) 
Journal of European Public Policy. 
more interventionist group of “market-shaping” Member States,69 and not by the UK. The UK can 
be associated with much of the technical rigour of the new rulebook,70 but the overall direction 
and interventionist form of the rulebook reflects the dominance of the market-shaping coalition of 
Member States – though it is a result of the interplay of a host of drivers. The UK, as a member of 
the more liberal “market-making” coalition, was less influential.71 To the extent the UK’s influence 
was marked, notably in its espousal of a proportionate approach to regulation and a commitment 
to impact assessment, its legacy appears secure. Proportionality mechanisms, for example, now 
abound across the single rulebook, and the Commission appears committed to ensuring 
proportionality of rule design and application.72 Certainly, the absence of the UK will mean the 
removal of a friction against ever-intensifying harmonization and of a strong advocate for 
subsidiarity; harmonization can be expected to become more of a default option where questions 
as to the appropriateness of new EU regulatory intervention arise; the treatment of “fintech” may 
become a bellwether in this regard.73 Overall, however, the absence of the UK as a political actor 
is unlikely to be determinative for the development of the single rulebook. This is not only a 
function of political dynamics, but also of the current nature of the single rulebook. 
The single rulebook has, after years of wide-ranging, re-setting reforms, settled into shape 
as a mature regulatory system with few major gaps. This is not to suggest that the rulebook will 
remain static, but rather that its development is unlikely to be a function of intense political 
contestation over normative regulatory design choices. Instead, calibrating reforms and 
adjustments can be expected to shape the rulebook. For example, a horizontal “stock-take” of the 
entire regulatory landscape, directed to assessing the combined effect of the crisis-era reforms, has 
been carried out,74 and a swathe of related technical reforms are in train. Similarly, all the crisis-
era legislative measures have review clauses and will be reviewed over the short-to-medium term. 
This calibrating review/reform process is likely to be shaped by technocracy and not by political 
contestation, particularly given the increasing reliance by the Commission on the European 
Supervisory Authorities in carrying out reviews. The important December 2017 Commission 
Proposals on the prudential regulation of investment firms, for example, draw heavily on the 
technical support provided by the European Banking Authority.75 Technocratic influence will be 
further embedded by the almost continual reforms being made to the highly technical and detailed 
administrative components of the single rulebook. These components are very dynamic, being in 
a state of almost permanent reform. To give only one example, while MiFID II/MiFIR came into 
                                                 
69The classification of Member States into more interventionist “market-shaping” Member States and more liberal 
“market-making” Member States has been influential in the political economy discourse on the evolution of EU 
financial governance; for early articulations see Quaglia, “The ‘old’ and ‘new’ politics of financial services 
regulation in the EU”, 17 New Political Economy (2012), 15 and Quaglia, “Completing the single market in 
financial services: The politics of competing advocacy coalitions”, 17 Journal of European Public Policy (2010), 
1007. 
70For analysis of where UK influence has been most marked, see City of London Corporation, “Shaping legislation: 
UK engagement in EU financial services policy-making”, Report by Norton Rose Fulbright (2016). 
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74Commission, Call for Evidence, cited supra note 72. 
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force only in January 2018, it is already being revised at the administrative level;76 and in the 
immediate run-up to its application in January 2018 the European Securities and Markets 
Authority produced a host of soft guidelines on its application, designed to address issues of urgent 
industry concern.77 Technocratic influence, exerted through the three European Supervisory 
Authorities, and not political contestation, is likely to be the dominant influence on the 
development of the single rulebook. 
 
 
4. The Long(er) term picture: Institutional arrangements 
 
4.1. The institutional setting and reform dynamics 
 
Brexit can, however, be expected to shape institutional/supervisory governance for the EU 
financial market, at least to some extent. The EU’s current institutional arrangements for the 
coordination of financial governance within the single market take two forms. First, the European 
System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) supports the development of administrative rules by the 
Commission and the adoption of soft law for the single market; it also provides the infrastructure 
for the coordination of supervision at national level, the supervisory management of cross-border 
risks, and the development of convergent supervisory practices across national supervisors. The 
ESFS is composed of: the Member States’ national regulators (or “national competent authorities” 
(NCAs)) which provide the foundations of the system, supervising regulated actors in according 
with the EU’s single rulebook; the three sectoral European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs),78 
which are charged with a range of quasi-regulatory and supervisory/supervisory co-ordination 
functions and their co-ordinating Joint Committee; and the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB), which is charged with monitoring pan-EU system-wide risks and macro-prudential 
stability. The ESAs are designed to contribute to the development and consistent application of 
the single rulebook (including through the development of administrative rules and the adoption 
of soft law) and the promotion of supervisory convergence. Sitting uncomfortably alongside the 
pan-EU ESFS are the newer and distinct operational structures which relate to Banking Union and 
to the related mutualization of banking sector risk by its “participating” Member States. The 
Banking Union arrangements apply to euro area Member States (on a mandatory basis) and other 
“participating Member States” (on a voluntary basis) and to their deposit-taking institutions. The 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), operational since 2014, brings the supervision of the euro 
area’s some 6,000 banks (non-euro area Member States may join the SSM on a voluntary basis, 
but have yet to do so), directly and indirectly, under the control of the ECB. The ECB has overall 
oversight of the SSM; is directly responsible for the supervision of 119 of the EU’s most important 
banking groups (“significant banks”); and oversees the supervision of other euro area banks (“less 
significant banks”) by their NCAs. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), fully operational 
since 2016, brings the resolution of SSM-zone banks, directly and indirectly, within the control of 
Banking Union’s Single Resolution Board (SRB) (like the ESAs, an agency set up under EU 
legislation) and includes a Single Resolution Fund to support resolution. 
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The establishment of the ESFS initially and Banking Union subsequently reflects the 
confluence and interaction of a host of preferences – political, institutional and technocratic in the 
main – which were shaped by the exigencies of equipping the EU with a functioning risk 
management and fiscal support capacity in the wake of the initial financial crisis and subsequent 
euro area crises.79 Both arrangements are, reflecting their complex origins, still “works in 
progress.” Banking Union is bedding in, but has yet to be completed. Progress on the missing legs 
of Banking Union, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme and the “fiscal backstop,” remains 
slow,80 reflecting material political contestation on the extent to which risks should be further 
mutualized and EU regulation to reduce risks strengthened. The three ESAs, the key components 
of the ESFS, have been in place for longer but are also works in progress. Their powers are being 
continually extended by incremental legislative grant,81 but also by means of judicious and at time 
entrepreneurial application by the ESAs of their array of soft powers.82 
In the absence of some form of resetting shock, akin to the shocks which attended their 
construction, an incremental bedding in and expansion of the powers of the ESAs might have been 
expected over the next few years, not forgetting that these powers are shaped but also checked by 
the different preferences, interests and legal constraints which played a role originally. Similarly, 
Banking Union might have been expected to develop in accordance with the evolution of 
preferences relating to risk-mutualization and risk-reduction. Brexit, however, might be regarded 
as providing something of a resetting shock by removing the UK as a potential friction against 
their institutional development. From the outset, the UK resisted any transfer of direct supervisory 
powers to the three ESAs, typically calling in aid the Meroni prohibition on agencies exercising 
discretionary powers without appropriate conditionality.83 It also sought to ensure that single 
market interests were not trumped by Banking Union/euro area preferences on questions of 
institutional design, fighting against any encroachment of Banking Union, or similar new 
structures, on the single market and against EMU needs driving EU supervisory arrangements.84 
 
4.2. Banking Union and Brexit 
 
Initial indications suggest that Brexit is likely to have most relevance for the ESAs, and 
specifically ESMA. Banking Union, while still incomplete and not without contestation,85 is 
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85The SSM has faced criticism, most notably over summer 2017 in relation to the State-aid-supported liquidation of 
certain Italian banks, which led to disapproval of the SSM for failure to intervene earlier. The European Parliament 
is also proving an assertive interlocutor, challenging the SSM on, e.g. the proportionality of its action and, most 
recently as to its competence (in relation to the SSM’s contested Guidelines on the treatment of non-performing 
becoming normalized and there are few indications that it will be destabilized by Brexit. Brexit is 
also unlikely to accelerate the completion of Banking Union, given that euro area preferences on 
risk mutualization and risk reduction will dictate the speed at which Banking Union is completed.86 
This is not to say that there will not be effects. Preferences on risk mutualization/reduction may 
be shaped by Brexit-related effects, particularly if stability risks arise, while Brexit is providing 
the ECB with opportunities to embed its authority within the SSM and Banking Union (including 
by monitoring the preparedness of banks for Brexit and adopting positions on relocation to the 
Banking Union zone). The Commission’s December 2017 Proposals to empower the ECB to 
supervise within the SSM large systemic investment firms, as well as banks,87 can be directly 
related to Brexit, being designed to address the supervision of the UK investment firms which 
dominate in the EU investment firm sector and which are likely to relocate part of their operations 
to the EU. The fate of the Commission’s Proposals is at present uncertain, particularly as the Treaty 
competence for the reform is not entirely clear.88 At the very least, however, the Proposals indicate 
a Commission appetite for further empowering the ECB within the SSM, and they may yet come 
to represent the “wedge” opening the way to the ECB’s supervisory competences within Banking 
Union being significantly extended. Overall, however, the completion and subsequent 
development of Banking Union can be expected to depend on the complex interaction of political 
and institutional forces which shaped its establishment and is unlikely to be materially shaped by 
Brexit. 
 
4.3. The ESAs and Brexit 
 
Brexit effects may be more pronounced in relation to the ESAs. The ESAs are also becoming 
normalized, being used more and more frequently by the Commission and the co-legislators to 
deliver EU financial policy and to support integration, and thereby extending their distinct 
transnational influence.89 Since 2011 they have experienced an incremental if ever intensifying 
accretion of formal and informal powers and a strengthening of their related capacity to exert 
technocratic influence over EU financial governance.90 In September 2017, however, the 
Commission presented its ESA Reform Proposal91 which may lead to more punctuated change and 
to an acceleration of the “agencification” of EU financial governance which is already underway. 
The Proposal suggests changes to the governance of the ESAs (by diluting the power of the 
decision-making Board of Supervisors (composed of the 28 (soon:27) NCAs and locating certain 
decisions, particularly those where the Board may be in conflict, in that they relate to action against 
an NCA, within a new, bureaucratic Executive Board); funding reforms (by injecting an industry-
funded component in to the ESAs’ funding model which is currently based on EU/Member State 
funding); and a strengthening of the ESAs’ soft coordinating/convergence powers, including by 
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91COM(2017)536. 
means of a new binding/hard power to request information directly from regulated actors and to 
impose sanctions for non-compliance.92 
The timing alone of the Proposal, and the relative speed with which it followed the earlier 
February 2017 Commission consultation, suggests a link to Brexit. Further, the Commission’s 
February 2017 ESA Consultation had identified a “need to reflect carefully about “supervisory 
arrangements” given Brexit,93 and its June 2017 review of the Capital Markets Union agenda 
argued that Brexit “strengthens the need for future integration of supervision at EU level.”94 The 
imprints of Brexit can certainly be identified fairly easily in the Proposal, notably in relation to 
the suite of proposed new ESA powers directed to third country actors. The Proposal suggests that 
the ESAs be empowered to monitor and review NCA decision-making where NCAs authorize EU-
based financial actors who delegate operations to a third country; this new power relates directly 
to the earlier summer 2017 opinions issued by the ESAs on the management by NCAs of 
relocations from the UK to the EU,95 and represents a hardening of the ESAs’ ability to police 
NCAs in this regard. The Proposal also embeds the ESAs more fully in the third country regime. 
Currently, the ESAs provide technical advice to the Commission on equivalence decisions. The 
Proposal would extend the ESAs’ role to monitoring the ongoing status of third country 
jurisdictions, reporting to the Commission where concerns arose, and entering into agreements 
with third country authorities which enhance supervisory coordination between the ESAs and 
relevant third country supervisors. These powers can be characterized as “tooling up” the EU to 
manage the UK as a third country actor, but they are also likely to have the long-term effect of 
empowering the ESAs in an area of significant political and market salience and of affording them 
the opportunity to deepen their influence and authority more generally. EU relations with third 
countries hosting major financial markets, including the US but also the major Asian economies, 
can be expected to become more sensitive as the EU adjusts to the UK as a major offshore financial 
centre; the sensitivities associated with the equivalence of Switzerland are already clear.96 The 
ESAs have already proved adept in deploying their advisory powers in relation to the third country 
regime, and their coordinating role in international financial governance generally, to strengthen 
their institutional position within EU financial governance.97 The Proposal’s reinforcement of the 
ESAs as pivotal technocratic actors in what can be expected to be a sphere of ongoing significance 
to EU financial governance policy can be expected to further embed them within EU financial 
governance. 
Brexit cannot easily be identified, however, as a determinative influence on the 
Commission’s 2017 Proposal overall or as driving major long-term reforms to the ESAs; it forms 
part, but only a part, of a complex matrix of causative effects. The 2017 ESA Reform Proposal has 
been in gestation for some time and can be traced back to the initial 2013-2014 review of the ESAs 
and its suggestions for reform.98 It can also be associated with the current CMU agenda. The 
Commission had, from the adoption of the CMU agenda in 2015, linked the achievement of CMU 
to stronger supervisory coordination through the ESAs, while the Council had also called for 
enhanced supervisory convergence, through the ESAs, as essential for CMU.99 The 2017 ESA 
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Consultation and Reform Proposal both directly link the reforms to a CMU-need to strengthen 
supervisory convergence,100 while a separate Commission Communication, issued alongside the 
2017 ESA Reform Proposal, has tied a strengthening of supervisory coordination under the 
reforms to the strengthening of CMU and to an acceleration of financial integration.101 
The completion of Banking Union and of EMU can also be identified as influences on the 
2017 Proposal. The Commission located the 2017 ESA Reform Proposal within these two ongoing 
projects, linking the supervisory reforms to Banking Union’s support of financial stability, as well 
as to the 2015 call by the “Five Presidents” for EMU to be supported by a “Financial Union” 
(operating alongside Banking Union) which would be supervised by a single capital markets 
supervisor.102 Certainly, the ESA reform process has provided the Commission with the 
opportunity to use the ESAs as a means to buttress the EU against Brexit-related risks, and the 
absence of the UK has cleared the political pathway, to a certain extent, for additional 
empowerments. Nonetheless, the ESA reform process should be located in the wider set of 
preferences and interests and policy agendas which drive institutional reform to EU financial 
governance. 
 
4.4. ESMA and Brexit 
 
Brexit may prove to have long-term effects on institutional design in one respect, however, in that 
it can be associated with the proposals to materially strengthen one of the ESAs – ESMA – by 
means of additional direct supervisory powers. 
 ESMA, alone among the three ESAs, has direct supervisory powers but these are limited 
and circumscribed and apply to two sets of regulated actors only - EU credit rating agencies and 
trade repositories (in essence, massive data repositories for derivatives market data). The ESAs, 
by sharp contrast with the ECB within the SSM, are not designed as executive supervisors with 
binding powers, but as coordinating bodies. The legal difficulties aside,103 direct supervision 
represents a significant incursion into Member States’ autonomy; it can, particularly in a 
rescue/resolution context, lead to the imposition of fiscal costs back on Member States or require 
the mutualization of risk; and it can limit Member States’ ability to wield economic levers, 
particularly where supervision impacts on sovereign borrowing costs or limits liquidity which 
disrupts the market’s funding capacity. Member States also have often starkly different preferences 
in relation to the centralization of supervision, reflecting deeply rooted economic and financial 
system models. These were sharply exposed by the Banking Union reforms and the related 
centralization of supervision and mutualization of risk, but they have also coloured the 
development of the ESAs’ supervisory powers as primarily coordinating powers, given resistance 
across many Member States to the centralization of supervisory powers.104 
Over 2017, however, the June 2017 CCP Supervision Proposal and the September 2017 
ESA Reform Proposal proposed a material strengthening of ESMA’s supervisory powers. The CCP 
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Proposal proposed that ESMA be conferred direct supervisory and enforcement powers over third 
country CCPs. The ESA Reform Proposal proposed that ESMA be conferred  supervisory powers 
(based on the legal and operational template developed for rating agencies and trade repositories) 
over a limited set of sectors (with relatively small regulated populations) with distinct and strong 
cross-border settings: certain funds with EU regulatory “labels”; data service providers; 
benchmark administrators; and certain prospectuses oriented towards the professional fund-raising 
markets. What is perhaps more revealing is what the Proposal hints at. The Commission located 
these limited empowerments within a wider movement “towards a single capital markets 
supervisor,”105 characterized them as “the first concrete steps towards a Single European Capital 
Markets Supervisor,”106 moreover, it had earlier, in 2017, in the context of the completion of EMU, 
linked the 2017 ESA reform process to the “first steps” to be taken in the direction of a single 
supervisor as a support to EMU as well as to the single-market-wide CMU.107 While allowance 
must be made for institutional opportunism and kite-flying, and while the Commission was at the 
same time careful to refer to subsidiarity constraints and functional realities,108 the Commission 
nonetheless appears committed to a clear direction of travel. 
 The two Proposals can be regarded as forming part of the EU’s financial integration project 
more generally and not as entirely Brexit-driven developments. As noted above, the 2017 ESA 
Reform Proposal is closely tied to the EU’s ongoing efforts to deepen financial integration and 
related to the process of completing EMU and Banking Union – Brexit receives only cursory 
reference.109 Nonetheless, the Proposals cannot be dissociated from Brexit. The Brexit imprints 
are clearest in the case of the 2017 CCP Supervision Proposal which gives ESMA supervisory 
powers over third country CCPs, given the political and market salience of the potential 
“offshoring” of euro clearing in the UK. With the 2017 ESA Reform Proposal, it is difficult to 
entirely disentangle its reforms from Brexit, particularly as the absence of the UK removes a 
significant political road-block to empowerments to ESMA. The confluence of Brexit and CMU 
seems to have led to a material change to the Commission’s position, as the Commission has 
historically been reluctant to propose any significant empowerment of the ESAs and sensitive to 
the restrictions imposed by the Meroni ruling. Further, ESMA, as predicted by the political 
economy literature on agency development,110 has proved an astute and entrepreneurial actor, 
carefully deploying the opportunity represented by Brexit to reinforce its position. Over 2017, 
ESMA repeatedly called for a strengthening of its powers in relation to third country firms and for 
supervisory powers over third country actors;111 proposed an adjustment and toughening of its 
current third country-related powers;112 used its supervisory convergence powers to seize the 
Brexit agenda, examining the risks to the EU financial market from a “cliff edge” hard Brexit and 
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gradual strengthening of the supervisory framework should lead to a single European capital markets supervisor and 
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preparing possible mitigating action;113 and took the lead in addressing “race to the bottom” 
supervisory risks posed by Brexit-related competition114 by adopting robust guidelines, contained 
in its series of opinions on Brexit-related relocation of UK entities.115 
The fate of both Proposals is at present a matter of speculation and the Commission’s 
position cannot be taken as a reliable indicator of future centralization of supervisory power within 
ESMA. To take only one set of interests – political interests – contestation may be significant. The 
empowerments proposed in the 2017 ESA Reform Proposal relate to a limited set of actors who 
do not post material fiscal risk, but they can be expected to be challenged. Earlier, the CMU 
agenda, around which Member States interests have, for the most part coalesced, had not prompted 
political enthusiasm for direct supervision.116 While the 2015 Five Presidents’ Report suggested 
institutional support for centralized capital market supervision within the euro area, it is not clear 
that there is euro area political support for such a change – much less single-market-wide support, 
given persistent differences in capital market structures across the Member States and related 
divergences in preferences relating to supervisory organization. Brexit may unleash competitive 
forces which lead to Member States resisting any further loss of supervisory autonomy. France, 
for example, has been pushing for stronger ESMA-located oversight of the EU funds industry, but 
Luxembourg, a major centre for funds regulation, has been strongly opposed.117 
More generally, while the direct supervisory empowerments proposed for ESMA relate to 
regulated actors unlikely to generate fiscal risk, they may establish a material precedent which 
may not be palatable politically. Political interests will be shaped by industry preferences which, 
as the 2017 ESA Consultation indicated, can be marked. While the 2017 ESA Consultation saw 
some industry support for a strengthening of ESMA’s supervisory convergence role, it also 
produced a broad consensus that the ESAs were currently fit for purpose, and exposed hostility to 
any expansion of ESMA’s direct supervision powers, a concern to protect NCA 
discretion/autonomy, and calls for ESA restraint in relation to soft law and for the ESAs to respect 
the limits of their mandates.118 The specific CCP-related powers can also be expected to be 
questioned. Member States are unlikely to be sanguine as to the prospect of ESMA exerting direct 
supervisory powers over third country CCPs, given the precedent it establishes for locating direct 
supervisory power over systemically significant actors, without fiscal responsibility, at ESMA 
level – even allowing for the reality that in practice fiscal burdens are most likely to fall on the 
third country home supervisor. This is all the more the case as the CCP Supervision Proposal at 
the same materially strengthens ESMA’s role in relation to NCAs’ supervisors of EU CCPs by, in 
effect, conferring on ESMA approval/veto powers over CCP supervision, notwithstanding that the 
acute fiscal risk associated with CCP supervision remains at national level. 
If the two Proposals emerge from the negotiations in anything close to their current form, 
a material strengthening of ESMA’s direct supervisory powers which can be associated, at least to 
some extent, with Brexit, will follow. The impact on EU financial governance should not, however, 
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be overplayed. The combined effect of the 2017 CCP Supervision Proposal and the ESA Reform 
Proposal will not change ESMA’s essential characterization as a coordinating network actor, 
exerting primarily soft powers within the ESFS. The two Proposals may, however, mark the start 
of a second evolutionary trajectory, which may ultimately terminate in the centralization of direct 
capital markets supervision. For that to happen, a host of political, institutional, legal and 
functional frictions will need to be removed, and multiple and difficult institutional design 
decisions will need to be made and executed in a politically acceptable, functionally effective, and 
legally resilient manner. Not least among the legal and functional challenges are: the Treaty 
competences available to support such an institutional reform;119 Meroni restraints, assuming an 
agency model is used;120 the ability of EU administrative law to protect third party rights against 
maladministration by powerful supervisors;121 and whether, and if so how, centralized supervisory 
responsibilities should be split across the ESAs within the ESFS and/or the ECB within Banking 
Union, in relation to which a bewildering array of potential design choices arise, with related legal 
complexities. Brexit alone will not provide the resetting shock which makes the removal of these 
frictions and the successful execution of these design choices a likely prospect. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Speculation is perilous in the current environment. Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable to suggest 
that Brexit’s impact on EU financial governance will be contained and most likely limited. Current 
indications do not suggest material changes to the EU’s third country access arrangements beyond 
the “tooling up” of the EU’s institutional capacity to deal with third country actors. The single 
rulebook is unlikely to depart from its current developmental trajectory, which is being powered, 
for the most part, by technocratic ESA influence. As has long been the case in EU financial 
governance, the greatest uncertainty relates to the EU’s evolving supervisory/institutional 
arrangements. Here, Brexit may be one of the factors which lead to a significant future 
empowerment of the ESAs, and in particular ESMA. Brexit is only one, however, of a range of 
complex, dynamic and symbiotic political forces, institutional interests, legal constraints and 
functional challenges which must combine in the EU’s governance reform crucible if materially 
more supervision is to be located at EU level. 
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